Implications of Umno and Pas cooperation in Johor election

The outcome of the Johor election will not only determine the immediate governance of the state but will also provide critical signals regarding the viability of Umno's solo electoral strategy.

The 2026 Johor state election is unfolding against a backdrop of profound political fragmentation. The most consequential variable in this contest is the fractured relationship between Pas and Bersatu within Perikatan Nasional (PN).

This internal discord has generated a powerful gravitational pull towards a revived Umno-Pas understanding, marking one of the most significant developments in Malaysian politics since the seismic shifts of the 2022 general election.

As the nation’s most economically vital state – contributing significantly to the national GDP and serving as a traditional bellwether for Malay political sentiment – Johor prepares to go to the polls on July 11, 2026. The outcome will not only determine the immediate governance of the state but will also provide critical signals regarding the viability of Umno’s solo electoral strategy, the durability of the Barisan Nasional (BN)-Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal partnership, and the future trajectory of Malay-Muslim political cooperation in an increasingly volatile environment.

A turbulent history

The historical relationship between Umno and Pas has been characterised by oscillating cycles of cooperation and bitter ideological conflict, dating back to Pas’s founding in 1951 as a breakaway faction from Umno, driven by a distinctly religious conservative agenda. The first notable alliance emerged between 1974 and 1977, following the traumatic racial riots of May 1969. Yet this arrangement ended acrimoniously when a state of emergency was declared in Kelantan, culminating in Pas’s expulsion from federal and state governments.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed intense ideological warfare, epitomised by the infamous kafir-mengkafir (excommunication) debate, which deepened the religious and political chasm between the two predominantly Malay parties. More recently, the period between 2018 and 2022 saw an unexpected reconciliation, materialising through the Muafakat Nasional (MN) charter in 2019, forged in the immediate aftermath of Pakatan Harapan’s unexpected capture of federal power. This alliance proved ephemeral, however, as Umno’s subsequent decision to support Bersatu in forming the PN government ultimately sabotaged the nascent co-operation, setting the stage for the complex and often contradictory dynamics now unfolding in Johor.

Today, Johor’s political landscape serves as a microcosm of Malaysia’s broader realignment. Historically considered an impregnable bastion of Umno strength – having produced numerous prime ministers and deputy prime ministers – the state has demonstrated increasing electoral volatility. The 2018 and 2022 elections revealed that Johor is no longer a guaranteed stronghold, with a growing segment of the electorate exhibiting a willingness to consider alternatives to the dominant coalition. This transformation makes the upcoming election particularly significant, functioning as a bellwether for national political trends and a test case for the evolving strategies of the major coalitions.

Fracturing the Opposition: A weakened PN campaign

The most immediate and tangible implication of the Umno-Pas dynamic is the severe weakening of the opposition bloc, manifested through disarray within PN. Pas’s formal severance of its six-year political cooperation with Bersatu in early June 2026 has fundamentally fractured the coalition, dismantling the partnership that once effectively combined Pas’s formidable grassroots religious machinery with Bersatu’s secular Malay nationalist appeal.

This fragmentation is starkly reflected in PN’s diminished campaign for Johor. The coalition is contesting only 33 out of 56 seats, a sharp retreat from its earlier ambition to contest all constituencies. Internally, the distribution reveals further dysfunction: Bersatu is fielding 16 candidates, while Pas has been reduced to contesting just 11 seats, down from 15 in the 2022 state election. Tellingly, more than half of Pas’s line-up consists of new faces, signalling a party in transitional disarray rather than one projecting strength, stability, or a coherent governing vision.

The dysfunction is compounded by the operational reality that Pas and Bersatu, despite both utilising the PN logo, will campaign separately with entirely distinct election machinery. They held separate candidate announcement events, breaking decisively with the tradition of unified PN launches that had previously projected an image of cohesive opposition. Pas deputy president Datuk Seri Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man confirmed this schism, stating plainly that “each party will have its own machinery” and that each would “ensure the success of its own candidates.”

This disarray directly benefits Umno-led BN, which enters the contest from a commanding incumbency after winning 40 of 56 seats in the 2022 state poll. As Universiti Teknologi Malaysia political analyst Associate Professor Dr Mazlan Ali observed, “the main battle in the state election is between BN and PH,” with PN effectively ceding its role as the primary challenger.

The reduction in total candidates, from 239 in 2022 to 172 in 2026, is attributed by some observers to “political fatigue” exacerbated by the Bersatu-Pas feud. This suggests that the internal conflicts are not merely strategic disagreements but reflect deeper ideological and personal animosities that have eroded the coalition’s operational capacity and demoralised its grassroots supporters. Furthermore, the separate campaigning strategies mean that PN’s limited financial and human resources will be divided and diluted, significantly reducing the impact of what could have been a formidable challenge to BN’s dominance.

In a state where electoral margins in mixed constituencies can be razor-thin, such divisions could prove fatal to PN’s ambitions, effectively abandoning 23 constituencies without any opposition presence from the Malay-centric bloc.

The spectre of Muafakat Nasional 2.0: Rhetoric meets reality

Pas leaders have openly and repeatedly called for reviving MN’s framework, viewing the Johor polls as a pivotal opportunity. Tuan Ibrahim has been the most vocal proponent, declaring that the election presents “the right time” to revive the now-defunct alliance, framing it as necessary to “rebuild Malay-Muslim political strength and expand Bumiputera political influence.” In Johor, Pas state chief Datuk Dr Mahfodz Mohamed has acknowledged informal contacts with BN and indicated a willingness to explore electoral arrangements to avoid multi-cornered contests that would split the Malay vote.

However, analysts caution that the revival of MN remains far from certain. Universiti Malaya’s Datuk Dr Awang Azman Pawi noted that while recent high-level meetings between Pas and Umno leaders “suggested MN 2.0 was increasingly possible, it was still far from becoming reality.” The fundamental obstacle remains the profound lack of trust between the two parties. Umno leaders have not forgotten that Pas was a critical component of the PN government that contributed directly to Umno’s devastating electoral defeats in the 2022 general election.

The historical memory of Pas’s earlier betrayals, combined with its tendency to prioritise ideological purity over pragmatic coalition politics, makes Umno’s leadership deeply wary of any formalised arrangement.

Crucially, several analysts argue that Umno stands to lose more than it gains from a formal MN revival. Mohamad Hisomuddin Bakar of Ilham Centre pointed out that “Umno would have to surrender seats to Pas even though Pas has minimal electoral contribution in Johor,” noting that Pas won only a single seat in the state in 2022. BN chairman Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi has strategically maintained ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying formal cooperation. He stated that any discussions “were likely held at lower levels within the party” while reiterating that BN remains “focused on contesting all 56 seats under its own banner.”

This deliberate ambiguity allows Umno to benefit from Pas’s tacit support without formally binding itself to a partnership that could alienate its non-Malay component parties, MCA and MIC, both of which rely heavily on non-Malay support and would find a formal Umno-Pas alliance politically toxic.

Straining the Unity Government: Federal partners at odds

BN’s decision to go solo in Johor has placed a significant strain on its federal partnership with Pakatan Harapan. Both coalitions are contesting all 56 seats, creating unprecedented direct head-to-head contests between federal governing partners.

PH has responded assertively, with Johor PH chairman Aminolhuda Hassan criticising Pas’ directive as hypocritical, pointing out that Pas had previously labelled the Umno-DAP federal cooperation as “UmDAP,” yet now instructs its members to vote for Umno candidates. He accused Johor BN of being “not honest with the people” and of entering “a covert pact with Pas.”

While the official position from both coalitions is that state-level contests will not threaten federal stability, the precedent is concerning for PH. DAP secretary-general Anthony Loke has threatened to adopt a similar solo approach in Negeri Sembilan if BN performs well in Johor. Should BN achieve a resounding victory while going it alone, it could embolden Umno to adopt a more independent posture nationally, potentially marking the beginning of the end for the uneasy BN-PH collaboration at the federal level.

Johor, therefore, serves as a critical testing ground for whether going solo serves either coalition better than remaining in an awkward federal marriage.

Broader realignment scenarios

The Pas-Bersatu divorce may prompt a broader realignment. The first scenario involves a formal Umno-Pas alliance under MN 2.0, creating a conservative Malay-Muslim bloc. The second sees Umno maintaining solo status while continuing to receive informal Pas support – the current trajectory.

The third scenario, while improbable, involves PH-Pas cooperation should BN decide to go it alone nationally. The fourth involves PN’s potential collapse, leaving Bersatu politically isolated. What remains clear is that Umno stands as the biggest beneficiary of the opposition’s disarray.

Johor as the crucible of Malaysia’s political future

The result of the Johor election will not only determine the governance of Malaysia’s most economically important state but will also provide critical signals regarding the viability of Umno’s solo strategy, the durability of the BN-PH federal partnership, and the future of Malay-Muslim political cooperation.

Whether this culminates in a formal Pas-Umno partnership remains uncertain, but what is already clear is that Umno stands to be the principal beneficiary of the current opposition disarray.

Johor will serve as the crucible in which Malaysia’s next political configuration is forged, testing the enduring home truths of patronage, rural anxiety, and ethnic coalition politics in an era of unprecedented fluidity.

The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent that of Twentytwo13.